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The great survivor is dead. Though Adam Malik was by no means the only 
politician to hold high office under both Guided Democracy and the New Order, 
he was by far the most distinguished and successful. Others were political 
hacks with no true political coloring, or representatives of specialized con­
stituencies not involved directly in the conflict between Sukarno and the 
army; but Malik had been a central figure in the formulation of Guided Democracy 
and a close counsellor of Sukarno. Moreover, having chosen against that leader 
in the crisis following the coup of October 1965, he was not thereby completely 
discredited in the eyes of his former colleagues. For many of his old leftist 
associates he remained a patron: a leader who would still receive and could 
occasionally aid them, who could still speak their language, if only in private, 
and who still—in spite of his evident wealth, Western admirers, and service 
to a counter-revolutionary regime—seemed to embody what remained of the Generation 
of ’45, the fading memories of a radical and optimistic youth.
To survive so successfully, a man must either be most simple and consistent, 
or quite the opposite. No one could accuse Adam Malik of transparency, yet 
there was a consistency about the image he cultivated. From early youth he 
appeared as a radical nationalist, a man of the left; and however unsympathetic 
the regime to that viewpoint he never allowed the pursuit of ambition completely 
to cloud that picture. He had a fine sense of how far one could go (which 
was farther than many politicians dared) and he had a sense of history that 
told him Indonesia needed a continuing memory of its revolution. The need 
for such a symbol was also felt by the military rulers of the New Order, who 
realized that reminders of the army’s revolutionary past would not suffice. 
This enabled Malik to function as something of an official gadfly, criticizing 
the New Order's failure to live up to the nation’s ideals at the same time 
that his high office assured people of the regime’s intention to do so.
In a way, Adam Malik’s ability to straddle two regimes has drawn attention 
away from what may have been his greatest contribution to Indonesia's national 
development. This contribution he made very early in his career. In 1937, 
when he was just twenty years old, he founded the nationalist news agency 
Antara, and led it through the turbulent years of war, revolution, and struggling 
democracy until it was taken over by the state. The need for an independent 
news service had been widely recognized by Indonesian nationalist intellectuals, 
but it was the young and relatively uneducated Malik (he had attended only 
the Dutch-language primary HIS school in his native Pematang Siantar) who 
had the dedication and business sense needed to keep the infant agency alive. 
Antara was a vital link in the mental chain that connected members of the 
emerging indigenous middle class of the colony, making the idea of Indonesia 
seem the natural focus of modern elite identity. Without that connection 
a unified independent state might not have emerged from the archipelago’s 
far-flung and varied societies, and it almost certainly would not have survived.
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At the time he founded Antara, Malik was already deeply involved in politics. 
As a teenager in East Sumatra, he had joined Sukarno's Partindo party and become 
a member of its local executive. Later, in 1940-41, he was a member of the 
national executive of the moderately leftist Gerindo. Secretly, he had joined 
the PARI group, an underground movement begun by the exiled leftist Tan Malaka 
and dedicated to pan-Indonesianism and social revolution. In spite of the 
provocation which his views and his journalistic role posed to the colonial regime, 
he avoided prison until December 1941, when he was banished to Nusakembangan. 
He was freed a few months later in the wake of the Japanese invasion; for 
the next three years Antara flourished as part of the official Domei news 
network. Characteristically, Malik used the occupation both to extend his 
radical nationalist contacts and to make connections with sympathetic Japanese. 
He kept his Japanese links alive in a quiet way after the war, and later, 
during Guided Democracy, his constancy was rewarded with the favor of wartime 
associates who were reestablishing themselves in Indonesia as businessmen. 
In the last years of that regime, when Malik was under intense pressure from 
the Communists, these old friends' support was more than welcome.
During the war Malik involved himself with the young militants associated 
with the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka at Menteng 31. Through them he had a role 
in the Rengasdengklok Affair which precipitated the proclamation of the Republic. 
He thus participated in Indonesia's central symbolic event and was identified 
with the group which embodied the "pemuda-spirit" of the revolution. He himself 
was hardly the type one associates with the flaming-spirited pemuda, being 
fiery neither in appearance nor demeanor. He was, however, an intimate colleague 
of the more flamboyant Menteng 31 leaders, notably Sukarni and Chaerul Saleh, 
who had also been involved in Tan Malaka's PARI before the war.
Tan Malaka had been a great name in Indonesian leftist circles as Indonesia's 
arch-revolutionary, but he had been exiled more than two decades before and 
was largely unknown to the populace. He had returned secretly during the 
war but remained hidden and politically inert in West Java. His initial appearance 
after the revolution's outbreak had the caution born of long years on the 
run; but he was immediately adopted by radical nationalist politicians needing 
a hero who could match Sukarno-Hatta in stature and would oppose compromise 
with the Dutch. Malik, through Antara and his own writings, worked vigorously 
to package the old revolutionary in a way that would appeal to a new generation 
of militants. He was prominent in the Persatuan Perjuangan, the political 
front which Tan Malaka headed, and, after this was dissolved in early 1946, 
he founded the Partai Rakyat to continue its aims. When matters came to a 
head between Tan Malaka's supporters and the government in the Affair of July 3, 
1946, Malik rather uncharacteristically found himself unprotected and under 
arrest; but he soon arranged an escape, and in 1948, when the affair was forgotten 
in the government's new need for Tan Malaka's following to oppose the Communists, 
Malik combined his Partai Rakyat with other pro-Tan Malaka groupings to form 
the Murba party. When the Dutch siezed Yogya at the end of 1948 he again 
found himself briefly in prison—but this, in a life of high political risk, 
was the last time.
After Tan Malaka's death and the end of the revolution Malik continued to 
devote energy and finances to enhancing the memory of the leader and of the 
revolution's pemuda spirit. It seemed an exercise in nostalgia: Indonesia's 
parliamentary democracy was not a congenial environment for hero-worship, and 
Malik was neither a political organizer nor a charismatic leader. His Murba 
party was less an organization than a mood, a collection of ex-revolutionaries 
who could neither find a place in postwar Indonesia's social hierarchy nor
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accept the discipline of the Communist protest against it. But it was useful 
to Malik as an entourage, as a reminder of revolutionary service, and, most 
importantly, as a symbol of an alternative political approach-one which accepted 
neither the muddle of parliamentary politics nor the behemoth of Communist 
organization. It was on the need for another road that Malik counted. One 
reason for his failure to make a mark in Indonesia's parliamentary politics 
was simply that he did not believe in it. He did not think the country could 
solve its problems by party compromises or that it could accept the economic 
condition assigned it by the transfer of sovereignty. To his mind Indonesia 
needed strong leadership and could get it only by reviving the spirit and 
the constitutional arrangements of the early revolution. By the late 1950s 
this opinion had come into its own.
The turn to Guided Democracy brought into sudden prominence three leaders 
whose political careers had languished in the parliamentary period—Adam Malik, 
Muhammad Yamin, and Chaerul Saleh. All identified with radical, nonparliamentary 
nationalism, but they had not previously found favor with Sukarno because 
of their association with Tan Malaka, the President's great rival in revolution. 
The old offense was forgotten, however, in the need to have just such men 
formulate and legitimize a new, antiparliamentary regime. Under Guided Democracy 
Malik was made ambassador to the Soviet Union, a key post in a period when 
Indonesia was turning from the US to the USSR as a principal source of economic 
and military aid. Very quickly he acquired the reputation of one who knew 
how to handle foreigners, socialist or otherwise, combining an apparently 
frank and businesslike approach with a keen instinct for what would persuade 
his interlocutors to do what he wanted them to.
He returned to Indonesia in late 1963 to find his position both enhanced 
and endangered. Sukarno made him minister of trade and, more importantly, 
one of his confidants; but he had lost control of Antara to a pro-PKI management, 
and the Communists pressed hard against him and the Murba grouping. The PKI, 
seeing in Malik and in Chaerul Saleh (Yamin having died) a baneful influence 
on Sukarno and a potential source of fascist leadership for the country, devoted 
themselves with increasing effectiveness to isolating them. In the final 
year of Guided Democracy Malik worked to direct Indonesia's ideological course 
towards an implicitly anti-Communist "Sukarnoism," and in the heated conflict 
over this issue he developed links with two groups within which he had previously 
had few admirers—the military and Western diplomatic representatives. The 
coup of October 1965 thus posed Malik a choice: to continue a nationalist 
role, attempting to mediate between the President and the army to create an 
anti-Communist Sukarnoism, or to commit himself fully to his new sources of 
support, backing a military leadership that would open Indonesia to foreign 
capital.
Chaerul Saleh, facing this question, was unable to believe Indonesia could 
stray far from its revolutionary origins and, choosing Sukarno, ended his 
days in prison. Malik was of an altogether cooler temper: he knew when the 
romantic day was done and accommodated himself to 'the country's new masters. 
In the first years of the New Order he was, with General Suharto and the Sultan 
of Yogyakarta, one of the "triumvirate" presented popularly as Indonesia's 
leadership. Real power lay entirely with Suharto, but the Sultan symbolized 
stability and respectability and Malik both pragmatism and the revolutionary 
past. He was successively minister in charge of foreign trade, foreign minister, 
and speaker of parliament. His reputation as a pragmatist and a friend to 
capital grew until it seemed hard to believe that the elegantly suited gentleman, 
a noted collector of porcelain, had once been a noted revolutionary. Still,
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he received friends from the old days, and he systematically if cautiously 
urged greater attention to social justice. To some this was fascism with a 
human face, a window-dressing designed to enhance Malik's and the regime's 
standing with liberal opinion at home and abroad without conceding anything 
of substance. It was, however, the only humanitarian light showing from a 
leadership consumed by the desire for political security and economic gain.
In 1978, following the resignation of the Sultan as Vice-President, Malik 
succeeded to the post. Symbolically he was ideal: a Muslim Batak, he could with 
Suharto embody the balance between Java and the Outer Islands that had been 
portrayed in the old dwi-tunggal of Sukarno and Hatta. A civilian, he balanced 
the military. He could both portray the continuing representation of the 
revolutionary past and the pragmatic opening to the West and Japan. He had 
stature at home and abroad and, while he was not among Suharto's closest advisers, 
his word had sufficient weight that he formed an important alternative route 
to and source of influence on the decision-maker in the palace. Consequently, 
his largely symbolic office provided him with an important role.
In 1983 Malik retired. His health, he said, was poor—and since he died 
the following year, this was very likely the case. At the time it was widely 
speculated that he felt Suharto's regime to be too set in its ways for any 
meaningful reform of either policy or leadership, and that, if he wished to 
preserve his stature as an Indonesian national figure, it was time to leave. 
Perhaps that was true: Malik's reformist utterings rang increasingly hollow 
in a regime that seemed less and less open to change. He had not lost his 
ability to take a long look at Indonesia's situation, and he set his course 
accordingly. In any case, he left the political scene with his reputation 
largely intact: he had managed to be a pillar of the New Order without becoming 
simply its tool, to preserve memories of his revolutionary past while creating 
a new, "development-minded" image. He had been one of the most accessible, 
intelligent, and balanced leaders in two hard regimes; and he knew when it 
was time to bow out.
